The German War of 1866 was a turning point in the consolidation of Prussian hegemony over the emerging German nation-state. This article engages with a neglected aspect of this process by investigating the destabilizing effect of Prussia's territorial expansion at the expense of fellow monarchies in Hanover, Hessen-Kassel, Nassau and Schleswig-Holstein. It argues that the hostile
response of ruling houses related to the deposed dynasties and the disapprobation of legitimists at home placed the Hohenzollerns in a difficult position, as they often found themselves caught between the informal yet palpable pressure of Europe's 'Royal International' and the policies pursued by their chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. To escape this dilemma, King (from 1871 onwards Kaiser) Wilhelm and his successors sought to bring about a reconciliation with the alienated dynasties through treaty settlements, intermarriage and the appropriation of their rivals' symbolic capital in public speech acts. The way in which the Hohenzollerns courted their detractors betrayed a versatility that scholarship on the Prussian cult of monarchy has yet to fully appreciate. In fact, the Hohenzollern court's long-term preoccupation with sectional reconciliation reveals much not only about royal diplomacy in the second half of the nineteenth century but also about the workings of Germany's monarchocentric federal edifice and the role of civic initiative in the promotion of monarchical legitimacy.
On an overcast late-autumn morning in October 1909 thousands of curious citizens migrated to the Adolfshöhe near Biebrich in the Prussian province of Hesse-Nassau.
While they took their seats on specially erected bleachers, several hundred guests of honour entered a fenced-off area, at whose centre stood a large podium and tent. Here the province's leading officials and military officers awaited the arrival of Prince August Wilhelm of Prussia, the grand duke of Baden, the prince and princess of Wied andmost intriguingly-an official delegation from Luxembourg headed by Crown Princess Marie Adelheid. The occasion for this high-profile spectacle was the unveiling of the Nassauvian State Monument (Nassauisches Landesdenkmal), which celebrated the achievements of the Nassau dynasty as rulers of the eponymous duchy (1815-1866). In his welcome speech, the chairman of the monument committee praised Princess Adelheid Marie's Nassauvian ancestors for having fused the disparate territories they had acquired during the Napoleonic period into one state with a durable identity. The state monument itself expanded on this message with allegorical representations of glory, love and loyalty below a statue of Nassau's last duke, Adolph, who had inherited the grand ducal crown of Luxembourg in 1890. To dispel any last doubts about the intended message of the memorial, the eye-catching obelisk behind the statue of Adolph carried the inscription 'To the Nassauvian ruling house in love and veneration, their grateful people, 1909'. 1
At first glance this apotheosis of a dynast, about whom Kaiser Wilhelm II privately said that he would have been better suited for the life of a forest ranger, appears like one of the many invented traditions through which Wilhelmine Germans symbolically experienced royal authority. What made the ceremony nevertheless stand out was the fact that the House of Nassau had not reigned in Nassau for more than forty years and that the very Hohenzollerns whose representative was now joining in the festivities had been the cause of their relatives' dethronement. Duke Adolph had refused to take Prussia's side in the German civil war of 1866 and as punishment the victorious Hohenzollerns had annexed Nassau along with other uncooperative states like the kingdom of Hanover, the electorate of Hesse-Kassel and the city of Frankfurt. 2 'The very existence of said states between the eastern and western halves of the [Prussian] monarchy is a geographical threat', thundered Bismarck in the cabinet meeting where the decision was taken, and when the Russian tsar, Alexander II, protested against the removal of monarchs ruling by divine grace, the Prussian chief minister rejoined that Prussia would proclaim the Constitution of 1849 and unfurl the red banner of revolution should any foreign power intervene. 3 As if to drive home the point Berlin defied the claim of the Sonderburg-Augustenburg dynasty to Schleswig-Holstein and absorbed the two duchies for good measure as well, garnering Bismarck the reputation of an uncompromising 'white revolutionary' in the service of Prussian raison d'état. 4 What, then, explains the ostentatious display of inter-dynastic reconciliation at Biebrich several decades later? Was the unveiling of the Nassauvian State Monument just an aberration or did it perhaps signify something else about monarchical legitimacy in the Kaiserreich?
To answer these deceptively simple questions, due consideration must be given to the remarkably long-lived performance of Europe's royal houses as engines of modernization. Not long ago the historian Dieter Langewiesche paid tribute to their achievements by renaming the 1800s the 'century of monarchy' because the crowns were not only among the few time-honoured institutions to survive the transformations wrought by the French Revolution but also successfully engineered state-building reforms that enabled commercial, cultural and other kinds of progress in the first place and made monarchs valued intermediaries between past and present. 5 Although Langewiesche's brief reflections can but paint a rough sketch of historical change, his work is emblematic of the wider reassessment that the history of monarchy has undergone in recent work on nationalism, the development of mass culture, constitutional governance and ancillary areas of modernization. The 'Heirs to the Throne' research project currently underway at the University of St Andrews under the leadership of Frank Lorenz Müller, Robert Hazell's comparative research on western European monarchies at University College London's 'Constitution Unit', as well as the flourishing forum for debate provided by the Society for Court Studies and the Royal Studies Network with their attendant journals confirm the return of kings and queens to the mainstream of Anglo-American historiography, not to mention parallel developments in other countries. 6 That said, the fact that monarchs still manage to attract so much scholarly attention in spite of the sophisticated challenge presented by 'history from below' is a sign of as yet unanswered questions about the adaptability of monarchies to changing socio-political environments, the global projection of European power in the nineteenth century and the mechanics of international relations. 7 Mindful of the German War's sesquicentennial in 2016, the present article contributes to this thriving field of enquiry by investigating the phenomenon of dynastic 'statebuilding through state destruction' against the background of subnational political entities' consolidation into nation-states during the nineteenth century. 8 If one adopts Volker Sellin's heuristic distinction between countries that opted for monarchical constitutions after their creation like Belgium, countries whose monarchies were instrumental in the establishment of the nation-state like France, and, finally, syntheses of both like Britain, the Prussian method of national unification at the expense of other dynasts constituted a special manifestation of the second type. 9 State creation through conquest entailed special risks, though: it will be argued that Prussia's actions in the summer of 1866 hurt its own credibility in the eyes of monarchical legitimists and foreign rulers, and that the Hohenzollerns therefore made it a priority to mend fences with the dynasties they had dispossessed.
The process of reconciliation played out before both diplomatic and domestic audiences. The exiled monarchs had familial ties to other European courts that showed irritation at Berlin's high-handed conduct, not least because of the violation of their own agnatic rights by the abolition of the thrones in question. Although neither Tsar Alexander II nor Queen Victoria of England went so far as to pursue retaliation by violent means, resentment lingered for the treatment meted out to their relatives and occasionally the grievances of these courts rose to the surface during moments of international tension. In the domestic sphere the dethronement of the Guelph, Brabant, Nassauvian and Augustenburg dynasties was likewise sure to remain a contentious issue due to the 'monarchocentric' make-up of the German polity. 10 The larger states of the 'Third Germany' such as Hanover had developed elaborate 'tribal' (stammlich) and other cultural idioms to anchor dynastic loyalty in the minds of the heterogeneous populations acquired from the debris of the Holy Roman Empire. 11 From the vantage point of state-building, Prussia's displacement of four legitimate dynasties therefore became, according to Hans Schmitt, the 'most embarrassing consequence of the war of 1866' because the Hohenzollerns could never feel quite sure of their new subjects' loyalty as long as the monarchs in exile refused to relinquish their titles and thereby presented a latent alternative to the Prussian system of rule. 12 The pacification of the annexed provinces was complicated by the two-pronged mission of Hohenzollern state-building, which pursued the dual aim of making Prussians and raising Germans. School textbooks, patriotic commemorations and the army insisted that the two identities went hand in glove, even though Hanoverians and Nassauers often found it easier to identify with the Hohenzollerns as figureheads of the entire German nation than as champions of Prussian particularist traditions that clashed with their contrarian historical memories. 13 This essay will explore the strategies Hohenzollern rulers developed to cement their fragile legitimacy. These solutions were not free from contradictions because, as Mark Hewitson shrewdly notes, by Wilhelm II's reign the popularity of the kaiser 'came to rest either on the rapid invention of political traditions or on a cult of modernity, confusingly mixed with archaism, that was designed to compensate for any political shortcomings'. 14 Due to such paradoxes some historians conclude that the Hohenzollern court proved unable, in the final analysis, to devise popular, national rituals in place of the older Prussian dynastic ones. 15 By contrast, it will be suggested that the symbolic assimilation of the annexed provinces into Prussia's cult of monarchy bore a nuance that made Hohenzollern kingship both Prussian and transcendental. The first part of the discussion will examine why the German War was a historical watershed for the Hohenzollerns before I turn in the second and third sections to the foreign-political and domestic aftermath of this event.
A 'Rude Shock': The Overthrow of Monarchies in Historical Context
King Wilhelm's assent to the removal of fellow monarchs at the end of the German War was in itself neither unusual nor novel. Rulers reigning 'by divine providence' could look back on a long series of revolts and wars in which either their subjects or even foreign rivals had challenged their authority to govern. The most serious attack on divine monarchy had emanated from the French Revolution, followed by Napoleon's dethronement of established dynasties like the Bourbons in Spain and the mediatization of smaller principalities in Germany and the Italian peninsula. Prussia itself became one of the major beneficiaries of Napoleon's reforms at the Congress of Vienna (1815), where the Hohenzollerns acquired territories previously seized from the Catholic church and imperial knights in the Rhineland and Westphalia. 16 Yet the fifty years of relative peace spanning the end of the Napoleonic era and the German Wars of Unification (1863-71) afforded the 'satiated' monarchies in Germany a much-needed opportunity to consolidate their gains and discredit anyone who wilfully upset the status quo. This readjustment to the exigencies of state-building prompted an expansion of government bureaucracies, conscription and new patriotic pedagogies that were premised on the idea that sovereigns ruled over self-evident, organically grown communities.
A notable practitioner was the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm IV (ruled 1840-1861), whose mystical conception of kingship was founded on the belief that divinely enlightened monarchs should govern on behalf of and, where necessary, in consultation with the ancient corporations (Stände) of the realm. 17 The fiction of natural harmony between the interests of the crown and the people was taken even further in the medium-sized German states. Here propagandists employed the metaphor of the Stamm, which carried not only primordial, quasi-ethnic connotations of 'tribal' group relations but also configured the dynasty as a tree trunk with branches that signified territories and populations won through inheritance, war or diplomacy over time. 18 This symbolic visualization implied that subjects enjoyed the benefits of order, stability and prosperity thanks to the crown because the achievements of the state and the ruling house were one and the same. The author of a widely used Hanoverian textbook for secondary schools from the early 1860s expressed these sentiments well when he reminded his readers that for as long as king and subjects 'recognized their common destiny and stood by each other faithfully from beginning to end', they would master all adversity. 19 Tellingly, too, a similar textbook from Nassau made the frank admission that the history of the ruling house formed 'quite naturally' the red thread of regional history on account of the duchy's artificial genesis. 20 The revalorization of monarchical legitimacy in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars enabled combative defenders of royal sovereignty like Georg V of Hanover, Adolph of Nassau, Friedrich
Wilhelm of Hessen-Kassel and Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia's successor, Wilhelm, to implement unpopular policies and survive political battles with their parliaments that might otherwise have cost them their crowns. 21 To return to the question of why the dethronement of unloved German princes in 1866 would attract so much attention, the simple answer is that this coup was staged not by revolutionary firebrands or political upstarts but rather by a conservative monarch against like-minded peers. Wilhelm himself hesitated for a moment to divest his adversaries of their legitimate patrimony because he felt that such a step smacked too much of 'Emperor Napoleon's acts of violence'. 22 Alexander II of Russia warned his uncle of the 'rude shock' that the monarchical principle was about to suffer. Confronted with weighty problems of his own following a recent Polish uprising and serf emancipation, the tsar's reception of the Hanoverian envoy sent to St Petersburg to enlist his help was more gloomy still: 'It only remains for me to wish that the social order and peace of Europe have not been upset too much by the consequences of this crisis.' 23 Hanoverian Guelphs to boycott the promulgation of the annexation law, your royal house, with whom you have shared good and bad times for a thousand years, with whose magnificent ancestors your brave and noble forebears have won glory on the battlefield … and made Hanover a respected name in peaceful competition with other German brother tribes, will cease to exist; a foreign king will govern you who, despite being a German prince, has nothing in common with you except that his crown comes from the same place as that of your ancestral ruling house-from the Lord's table, which is to say by divine grace. 28 Not content to merely protest, Georg V paid journalists and press agents lavish sums to sway southern German and foreign governments in favour of intervention on his behalf. His personal wealth allowed him for a time to spend as much on bribes to the French press as Prussia and Austria-Hungary. 29 In addition, the exiled king funded paramilitary expatriate organizations in Britain and France, collectively known as the 'Guelph Legion', to prepare for a future European war in which they would side with Prussia's enemies to liberate the Hanoverian fatherland. 30 Finally, after notifying Prussia. 31 To be sure, the importance of these machinations and their impact on popular opinion
should not be exaggerated. In fact, not everybody bemoaned Prussia's disregard for Otto Hintze also served a none-too-subtle psychological purpose. To learn patriotism, the founder of the Reich declared in his memoirs, Germans needed states headed by 'a prince on whom their loyalty can be focused' to prevent them from falling 'prey to nations who are more tightly forged together'. 36 In the final analysis such appeals to established attachments cloaked Prussian leaders'
dependence on the cooperation of other monarchs lest the new nation-state be popularly perceived as a vehicle of Prussian domination. For instance, one of the reasons why Berlin agreed to restore occupied Saxony to King Johann following the end of the German War was that they did not want to raise anti-Prussian feelings higher than they already were. 37 The reactionary chief minister of the grand duchy of HesseDarmstadt, Reinhard von Dalwigk, underlined the degree of legitimist mistrust by stating defiantly that if he ever saw his master being deprived of his sovereignty, he would rather turn republican than become a 'second-class Prussian'. 38 home at the Saxon court and in the army, where they could continue to cultivate their allegiance to the Guelphs to some degree. 40 In an objective sense the anti-Prussian jibes of middling and minor potentates could make little difference to the distribution of power in the Reich. The Hohenzollern emperor-kings de facto remained the only monarchs to exercise full political sovereignty. 41 Furthermore, owing to the demographic, military and administrative preponderance of Prussia, the other princes were left with limited means to challenge the imperial executive. Even if the constitution gave the non-Prussian monarchies a legislative veto in the Federal Council, Frank Lorenz Müller's verdict is no doubt correct: the creation of the Reich marked 'a fundamental shift from a federation of states (Staatenbund) to a Prussian-dominated federal state (Bundesstaat)'. 42 Still, the residual clout of the German monarchs was considerable, largely because of their familial connections to dynasties abroad. Johannes Paulmann has spoken in this context of a 'Royal International' held together by familial ties, corporate social identity and a shared concern for collective security. 43 For much of the nineteenth century this august club occupied a subsidiary sphere of international politics that reacted sensitively to seismic shifts in the balance of power, as the Prussian government discovered in its dealings with the dethroned dynasties after the German War. After all, the duke of the Prussian chief minister opted for the alternative tactic of wilfully ignoring the duality of public and private monarchical agency. 46 As he put it in an internal memorandum, no matter the material cost, peace treaties with the deposed princes were valuable because of the anticipated positive 'impression in Europe overall'. 47 Strikingly, like Queen Victoria before him, Bismarck rhetorically enlisted here the plebiscitary aid of public opinion as a cipher for the will of the Royal International.
The diffuse yet palpable authority of this imagined community could be felt where it was absent, as a comparison of the compensation offered to ex-monarchs in the 1860s
and after the First World War bears out. The victims of the Italian Risorgimento and
German national unification, being connected to a wide network of royalty abroad, could expect generous terms. Grand Duke Ferdinand IV of Tuscany had his confiscated property returned to him upon the formal renunciation of his claims in favour of Piedmont. 48 Georg V of Hanover, the elector of Hesse-Kassel and the duke of Nassau were luckier still because they did not even have to abdicate to receive financial remuneration for their troubles. 49 Bereft of the support of powerful peers, the abdicated German princes could not count on such courtesy after 1918 and were fortunate that the electorate voted to compensate them at all. 50 Rather than negating the sway of the Royal International, the Prussian government's decision to repudiate its settlement with Denmark. 54 The extreme politicization of the Cumberland wedding despite its essentially private character highlighted one of the central dilemmas of royal diplomacy, namely, on the one hand, monarchs' role as national figureheads with responsibilities towards their government and subjects and, on the other hand, their cosmopolitan affinities with kinsfolk in the rest of Europe. The Hohenzollerns were no exception because the 'Guelph problem' confronted certain family members with awkward choices that were not entirely unlike the predicament Christian IX had manoeuvred himself into. The German crown prince and his English wife, a Guelph on her mother's side, found themselves caught between Bismarck's refusal to make major concessions while Ernst almost all the charges which one after another I brought against the Prussian Govt., and she could only reply that her position was a very difficult one, that she had no power whatever, and that she was openly accused of unpatriotic sentiments whenever she ventured to express disapproval of what was being done. 57 Torn between his loyalty to the government and the wish to conciliate, the crown prince was also prone to major mood swings. Only a few weeks after sending a congratulatory note to Christian IX on the occasion of the duke of Cumberland and Thyra's engagement, he launched into an 'explosive tirade' when the British ambassador, Lord
Odo Russell, alluded to the reception of the Hanoverian delegation in Copenhagen. The tone of the outburst 'conformed so little to his usually moderate and benevolent language', Russell told his French colleague, that it 'struck the interlocutor as being out of character'. 58 The outburst reflected the failure of the crown prince and his wife to live up to the conflicting expectations set in them, with the result that all their unfocused intervention achieved was to reveal their lack of real influence. In private Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm fumed that the chancellor's decision not to consult him on the deal with Austria discredited him in the eyes of his European relatives. 59 The unfolding of this human drama behind the scenes of European high politics was not lost on foreign diplomats, who reported to their superiors that the royal couple was at best out of step with current events and at worst let themselves be duped by Bismarck. 60 Viewed together, the reports showed Friedrich Wilhelm at his weakest, a far cry from the image of the imaginative operator painted in recent historiography and the contemporary ideal of 'hegemonic masculinity', which demanded self-control and strength. 61 Thus, rather than representing an unequivocal asset, royal diplomacy had the potential to erode the symbolic capital of its very practitioners. Moreover, from the vantage point of the German state, the competition of royals with the foreign office obstructed the work of regular diplomacy, which carried the risk, as Bismarck tersely put it, of 'making knotty problems even more twisted'. 62 The events of 1878 marked a period of transition in both the Hohenzollern court's relations with the dynasties disaffected since the German War and monarchical selfrepresentation more generally. As Paulmann has shown, royal houses were increasingly defined less by their internationalism and more by how they embodied the collective self-image of their nations and merged the separate sphere of monarchy with the state proper. 63 Royal pageantry and meetings between sovereigns facilitated this process by symbolically enacting international relations for the benefit of attending spectators and, with the help of the mass media, the wider public sphere. However, the fusion of national and dynastic discourses came at a heavy price: perceived personal antagonisms between monarchs were liable to have a greater impact on national politics and, by extension, international relations than before. Despite the obvious use of hyperbole for dramatic effect, the kaiser's recourse to the language of total war bore powerful testimony to the way in which unresolved dynastic grievances intersected with German nationalism and international relations, all under the attentive gaze of the international press. As on previous occasions, interventions by members of Europe's royal houses had failed to achieve their objective and, worse, had humiliated the supplicants themselves in a very public fashion. The British liberal periodical Truth, for instance, reported that the Prince of Wales' enquiry had prompted the kaiser to discourage the Prussian prince Friedrich Leopold from taking an English wife and tellingly concluded, 'This will be a blow to our Royal Family, as their "new generation" have so far been singularly unfortunate in their wooings.' 67 If the ability of royals to bring about political change head-on was therefore quite limited, their lack of impact stood in inverse proportion to the reach of their 'soft power'.
Royal Diplomacy in a Different Key
Beside constitutional prerogatives and the discourse of divine kingship, which in a Hessian-recruited regiments permission to observe his birthday and in 1899 officially transferred the traditions of the defunct kurhessisch military forces onto these units. 80 The Prussian court was prepared to bend dynastic etiquette far to accelerate this process of fusion. In 1881, the future Kaiser Wilhelm II married Duke Friedrich VIII's daughter Auguste Viktoria, despite doubts concerning the royal status (Ebenbürtigkeit) of the Augustenburg lineage. 81 A mésalliancemight have damaged the international reputation of the imperial family under other circumstances, but in this case the negative fallout was more than offset by Friedrich VIII's agreement to secretly renounce his claim on the two duchies in return. 82 That both sides were prepared to make such major concessions points to the propagandistic value of dynastic reconciliation, as can also be gauged from the following pathos-laden speech Wilhelm II gave in Kiel four years after the betrothal The quotation underscores the extent to which Hohenzollern marriage strategies and monarchical nationalism complemented each other: according to the logic of the kaiser's speech, the two Schleswig-Holstein princesses remained true to their ancestral Heimat precisely because they had agreed to let bygones be bygones when they became the wives of the most powerful royal family in Germany, in whose reflected glory all Schleswig-Holsteiners could now bask and from whom they could expect material help whenever 'emergencies needed ameliorating'. One historian of the Nassauvian succession in Luxembourg has suggested that the Hohenzollerns were hoping to get German-Luxembourg relations off to a fresh start in order to pave the way for closer relations. 84 Whatever the truth, German official newspapers readily reported on the kaiser's charm offensive and its effects, commenting that 'imperial honours' were heaped upon the new grand duke during a personal meeting in 1891 and that the pair afterwards parlayed in an 'unforced' manner. 85 The following year the Guelphs became the beneficiaries of even greater largesse when
Chancellor Leo von Caprivi decided to return their sequestrated property because his predecessor's notorious slush fund, the Welfenfonds, was starting to cause the government undue legal embarrassment. 86 The climax of reconciliation was reached with the highly publicized wedding of the duke of Cumberland's son and Wilhelm II's only daughter, in 1913, which cleared the path at last for the installation of a Guelph on the throne of Brunswick after a thirty-year regency. 87 Although the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung legitimately objected that imperial pressure on the Federal Council to confirm Prince Ernst August as duke of Brunswick even without his father's renunciation of the Hanoverian crown flew in the face of all earlier resolutions, the newspaper was missing the larger point of the exercise. 88 The fiction that the Kaiserreich represented a federation of princes governing through the Federal Council had long given way to a kaiser-centred system of monarchy, which publically styled Wilhelm II the supreme arbiter of Germany's political fate. This power shift in the wake of Wilhelm II's 'personal regime' rendered inter-dynastic reconciliation hostage to the whims of the kaiser's mercurial personality, and much of that restless army', on the victory of the British forces at Omdurman. In a second speech before
Hanoverian dignitaries in the Ständehaus he compared Hanover's 'sorely tested' former queen, Marie, to the Prussian patriotic icon Queen Luise. 90 Since he genuinely believed that his symbolic statements were sufficiently powerful to vanquish the legitimist opposition, he felt personally rejected by the news that the Guelph press continued to lambast his government and that sympathizers had presented a sword to the duke of Cumberland's son to be used against Prussia, and he hit back hard. 'That this august subsidies. 92 Although the interior minister concurred with the Hanoverian provincial governor's assessment that the Guelph Party in the Reichstag was facing decline even without outside interference, the authorities implemented surveillance anyway, as the compilation of secret dossiers on suspected Guelph sympathizers by the office of the governor bear out. 93 While Wilhelm II's ambitious agenda in certain respects resembled the tried and tested model of Bavarian 'nation-building' initiated by King Maximilian II after the revolution of 1848, the scope of the kaiser's plans was potentially more farreaching, thanks to advances in the quality of mass education and the proliferation of government-sponsored libraries since the 1860s. 94 One of Wilhelm II's most prominent character traits, Thomas Kohut has shown in his sharp psycho-historical portrait of the last kaiser, was an abiding desire to please the public. Even at his most imperious, he exercised royal soft power to make himself a cultural intermediary between 'many different Germanies which were only united in the national figure of the Kaiser'. 95 Only two months after his rant against the Guelphs, for instance, in January 1899 he issued the above-mentioned 'decree on tradition', whose grafting of the defunct Hanoverian and Hessian army's heritage onto Prussian regiments constituted an apparent bid to 'contribute to the bridging of differences' between provincial, Prussian and national identities. 96 A symbolic act with similar intent was the dispatch of the German crown prince to Hannover in July 1910, on the centenary of Queen Luise's death, on which occasion Wilhelm II's heir presented the city fathers with a copy of Johann Gottfried Schadow's famous double statue of the dead female monarch and her sister Friederike. The meaning of the gift was easy to divine. Depicting the ancestors of the kaiser and the duke of Cumberland in a warm embrace, the 'union of the two sisters … epitomizes the close connection, the fusion of their states, which was desired by fate and sanctioned by geographical location', as one pamphleteer put it. By way of rejoinder to the perpetual cry of the Guelphs that the Hohenzollerns were not Hanover's legitimate sovereigns, the same author pointed out that no member of the Guelph family had so far deemed it necessary to erect a monument to their kinswoman Frederica and that it was therefore up to the kaiser to confer his 'sovereign grace' (landesväterliche Huld) on her. 97 The imperial decree of 1899 and the appropriation of Frederica's memory to legitimize
Prussian-state-building exemplify the pervasiveness of 'mass-produced inventions' in the Kaiserreich, which conjured a sense of historical continuity and celebrated experiences that linked East Elbian Prussia to the rest of Germany. Eric Hobsbawm and other historians since have identified Wilhelm II as one of the phenomenon's prime instigators. 98 However, recent research has begun to offer a salutary corrective by questioning this top-down conceptualization of royal propaganda. Rather than being forced down the throats of an unsuspecting public, more often than not strategies of monarchical self-representation followed the lead of self-confident urban elites and bourgeois entrepreneurs who hoped to gain social prestige, emotional satisfaction and commercial rewards from their association with the cult of monarchy. 99 Hosting royalty became a particularly effective vehicle for honouring not only the exalted guest but also municipalities' own achievements and wealth. Wilhelm II's first visit to Hannover as emperor, in 1889, was a case in point. The magistrate set aside the vast sum of 84,000
Reichsmark so that sixty architects, sculptors and painters could suitably impress the German sovereign. 100 The visual symbolism of the artwork threw into relief how much licence these agents of municipal pride claimed in the dissemination of Hohenzollern invented traditions. On the Leinestraße a double-arched 'triumphal gate' with a large statue of Queen Luise at its centre and a banner reading 'Welcome to the place of my birth' awaited the kaiser. 101 The selection of Queen Luise was significant, for Wilhelm II's predecessors had purposefully allowed themselves to be connected with this popular idol of feminine virtue in order to soften the martial image of the Hohenzollern monarchy, but Hannover's city fathers set their own accents by stressing the Hanoverian origins of the Prussian queen. 102 It spoke to the authority of these local power brokers that the kaiser's gift to the municipality some twenty years later, which depicted Luise and her sister in their youth, still adhered to the discursive shift established by the magistrate during Wilhelm II's first visit.
The formative hand of provincial elites in the propagation of monarchical culture and, by extension, dynastic reconciliation likewise became very evident in the execution of the Nassauvian State Monument: the spiritus rectorof the project, the mayor of Biebrich, retired officers, officials and professionals requested Wilhelm II and the grand duke of Luxembourg's endorsement after the decision to erect a memorial had already been made. Despite the sponsors' gratitude to the dukes of Nassau for having created the eponymous region they inhabited, the actual purpose of the monument related only indirectly to the institution of monarchy itself, as it was above all concerned with the promotion of the local tourist industry, the elevation of Nassau's regional profile in
Germany and the strengthening of conservative consciousness to rein in the burgeoning influence of socialism in local politics. 103 The involvement of businessmen, doctors, architects and other members of the 'respectable classes' in charitable projects of this nature served one further important function, namely to confirm their status within the bourgeoisie. For much of the nineteenth century, public cultural institutions throughout western Europe-whether theatres, concert houses, art galleries or museums-depended primarily on private rather than state initiative. 104 Counter-intuitively, it was precisely the vibrancy of civil society which facilitated the popularization of monarchy and a grass-roots interest in dynastic affinities and enmities. As with monument projects and municipal festivities for the kaiser, philanthropists' collaboration with the Hohenzollern court and monarchs in exile was not free from ulterior motives, since it could be financially rewarding to play off one side against the other. This was the route chosen by the steering committee of one of Wilhelmine Germany's premier Heimat museums, the Fatherland Museum in Celle. 105 Like most such organizations, the Fatherland Museum rose to prominence on the coattails of 1890s reform movements, which aimed to preserve folklore, art and cultural This discursive conversation between the Hohenzollerns and their subjects was in no small part sustained by the enterprising spirit of local elites. The mayor of Biebrich, the Celle industrialist Bomann and the magistrate of Hannover were free agents who subscribed to a 'language of loyalty' (to borrow Laurence Cole's analogue from
Habsburg history) not out of subservience but rather because they expected tangible gains from their association with the monarchy. 111 The sophisticated deployment of historical references in their dialogue with the Hohenzollerns, Guelphs and House of Nassau at the same time sheds revealing light on the extent to which these elites had internalized the monarchical nationalism promoted by particularist state builders in the first half of the nineteenth century and enshrined by the constitution of the Kaiserreich. Much of this argument falls in line with Abigail Green's and Eva Giloi's scholarship on political regionalism and the material culture of monarchy in Germany, but this essay goes further since it contends that the Hohenzollerns-especially Wilhelm II-were more creative in their methods of monarchical self-legitimization than they have been given credit for. In contrast to the work of Giloi which posits that 'Hohenzollern dynastic anecdotes were emotionally accessible only within Prussia's core territories'
because royal mythology tended to revolve too much around traditional heroes of Prusso-Brandenburgian history like the Great Elector, Frederick the Great and Queen Luise, to leave space 'for diversion into alternate political symbols', the case studies discussed above underscore the Prussian court's adroit appropriation of other dynasties'
accomplishments and co-optation of the deposed royal houses to enhance their own symbolic capital. 112 It speaks to a 'remarkable consistency of political will from each generation to the next' in the Hohenzollern family but also to the perceived seriousness of the fractures within the Royal International after 1866 that all three emperors kept chipping away at the dynastic antagonisms despite their very different personalities and the resulting recurrence of conflict between fathers and sons. 113 Thus, although the victory of Prussian arms had been swift and decisive, the aftershocks of the German War were slow to abate, making monarchical state-building by way of state destruction an important site of contestation through which the Kaiserreich's crowned heads, related royals abroad and ordinary Germans negotiated the complex challenges posed by the unification of this heterogeneous nation-state in the heart of Europe. 
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